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Digital signatures are the building blocks of modern communication to prevent masquerading by 
any party other than recipients, repudiation by signatory and forgery by any individual recipient. 
Digital signature scheme is said to be standard if the signature (a) is a pattern depending upon the 
message to be signed, (b) is built upon some information publically known and unique to the 
signatory, (c) can be stored by all the recipients. While classical methods provide computational 
security only, quantum mechanics guarantees information-theoretically secure and standard 
digital signature schemes. However, standard quantum digital signature schemes are based on 
quantum one-way functions and hence require long term quantum memory for storing quantum 
signatures, which is not practically feasible yet. We demonstrate here a standard quantum digital 
signature scheme by replacing quantum one-way functions with multiparty controlled EPR 
channels. It allows signatory to generate non-locally correlated quantum signatures, instead of 
multiple copies of a unique quantum state, and assures security against any individual since 
others have non-locally correlated information. 
 
n general cryptographic setting, secrecy and authentication are the most important security 
goals. Secrecy assures that encrypted information is unintelligible to eavesdroppers while 
authentication verifies that information is valid and its originator is genuine. Symmetric 
cryptography provides assurance of both secrecy (one time pad) and authentication (message 
authentication codes) if sender and receiver are trusted parties.  
However, there can be issues regarding authenticity in case of mutual distrust between 
sender and receiver. For example, suppose Alice sends a message m to Bob using some 
authentication technique. Then following disputes can arise: (i) Bob can prepare a different 
message m' using authentication code and pre-shared secret information and claim that it came 
from Alice. (ii) Since Bob can change the authenticated message m and generate different 
message m' appended with authentication code, Alice can deny sending the message as there is 
no way to resolve this issue of who is cheating.   
Hence, among mistrustful sender and receiver, authentication alone is not sufficient to 
resolve all the issues and something more advanced is required. In general, it is believed that 
digital signature1,2 is the solution for this problem where sender appends a code with message 
that acts his/her signature. Sender’s signature assures authenticity and prevents both alteration 
from receiver or eavesdroppers and denial from the sender. In general, a digital signature scheme 
must assure that signed message (i) cannot be masquerade by any party other than recipients, (ii) 
cannot be forged by any individual recipient, (iii) cannot be repudiated by signatory and hence is 
transferable; if one of the recipients accepts the message as valid and transfers to the others, 
majority of other recipients must also accept the message as valid. 
To fulfill above security requirements, a standard digital signature scheme must be 
constructed while considering at least following three directions: (a) the signature must be a 
pattern depending upon the message to be signed. (b) The signature must be built upon some 
information publically known and unique to the signatory. (c) The scheme must allow all the 
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recipients to store a copy of signature for verification at later stage. The first two requirements 
assure that the scheme can evade masquerade, repudiation and forgery. In other words, 
constructing the signature over message being signed with input of some unique information 
makes it infeasible to create an illegal copy of signature for a signed message or constructing a 
different message for genuine signature.  
For example, Lamport’s one-time CDSS3 based on one-way function4 works as follows: 
the signatory secretly chooses l0 and l1 for future single bit message 0 and 1 respectively and 
publically announces one-way function f and its outcomes (0, f (l0)) and (1, f (l1)) as his/her 
signature. Since f is one-way function, it is computationally infeasible for anyone else to 
compute l0 and l1 from (0, f (l0)) and (1, f (l1)) respectively. In the messaging stage, the signatory 
presents (m, lm) as his/her signed one-bit message m. In the verification phase, any recipient can 
easily compute f (lm) and verify that whether it agrees with signatures or not. Since l0 and l1 is 
something uniquely known only to signatory while function f is publically known, the 
consistency between (m, lm) and announced signatures will certify that the message has been sent 
from the legitimate signatory. 
Classical digital signature schemes (CDSS) require public-private key pairs for 
generating one-way functions4 where signatures are bit patterns depending on the message being 
signed with the private key while recipient verifies the signature with signatory’s public key. 
However, CDSS with one-way function (hashing) as main ingredient are only computational 
secure and can easily be broken with efficient technology; quantum computer5.  
On the other hand, standard quantum digital signature schemes6,7 (QDSS) based on the 
laws of quantum mechanics guarantee information-theoretic security for classical message with 
quantum states being signatures of sender. However, QDSS6,7  are based on quantum one-way 
functions (QOWF)6,8 and hence require quantum memory for storing signatures and later swap 
tests7,8 for verification/comparison of signatures in case of dispute. Hence, both of these QDSS6,7 
are practically not feasible with current quantum technologies; either because of swap test or 
requirement of long term quantum memory.  
 To overcome the problem of quantum memory, recently an interesting QDSS9 for 
classical messages was proposed by using multiport optical techniques similar to those in 
QDSS7,10. The experimental realization of QDSS9 has also been presented where standard linear 
optical components and photodetectors are used11. Although multiport optical technique avoids 
long term quantum memory by introducing a new type of quantum measurement, quantum state 
elimination, however, causes substantial losses when the distance between recipients increases. 
To overcome loses in QDSS9,11; Wallden et al presented QDSS12 which require neither quantum 
memory nor a multiport but only commercially available experimental setup similar to those for 
quantum key distribution. The main idea in QDSS9-12 is reconsidered recently for multi-bit 
messages instead of naive iterations of single bit messages13. 
In QDSS9-12, signatory sends trains of coherent quantum states as his/her signature while 
recipients stores corresponding classical information, obtained through non-destructive quantum 
measurements. As a result, it overcomes the need of quantum memory. In the verification stage, 
signatory sends message and classical information for verification. However, QDSS9-12 are not 
standard digital signature schemes unfortunately in their construction. The private classical 
information stored by signatory is good enough for data authentication but not sufficient for user 
authentication. Such schemes, without incorporating security requirement (b), cannot assure user 
authentication while making public decisions. Hence, security against masquerading cannot be 
guaranteed over public channels, which is a serious drawback as for as standard digital signature 
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scheme is concerned.  However, QDSS9-12 can overcome masquerading, forgery as well as 
repudiation under very strict conditions; all quantum/classical channels are authenticated. It 
should not be the case with standard digital signature scheme. 
In short, QOWF guarantee information-theoretic security against masquerading as well as 
forgery and repudiation but make quantum memory an essential component of standard QDSS. 
Hence, in order to avoid the requirement of quantum memory for practically feasible QDSS, a 
scheme must be devised that fulfills all the standard security requirements (a), (b) and (c) but 
without QOWF.    
To circumvent this problem with standard QDSS in particular and asymmetric quantum 
cryptography in general, we demonstrate here a practically efficient and information-theoretic 
standard QDSS based on multiparty controlled EPR channel14,15. Over multiparty controlled EPR 
channels, generated by entanglement swapping16,17 and teleportation17, signatory Alice and 
receivers Bob and Charlie all have some pieces of control. It allows Alice to generate non-locally 
correlated quantum signatures for Bob and Charlie; signature states received by Bob and Charlie 
are not the multiple copies of unique quantum state but are different states non-locally correlated 
with each other. Such non-locally correlated signatures assure security against masquerading, 
forgery as well as repudiation and hence transferability is guaranteed. In general, multiparty 
controlled channel does not allow masquerading where signatory and receivers have non-locally 
correlated information in a unique fashion.  
Finally, all the existing QDSS are inspired by CDSS based on public-private key systems 
where signatures are generated by message and private key of signatory while recipient verifies 
the signature with signatory’s public key. However, our proposed QDSS is similar to digital 
signature standard (DSS) where a pair of signatures is generated from the message being signed 
while the recipients authenticate the message by comparing the signatures. However, our 
proposed QDSS is more efficient than DSS and different in construction, there is no classical 
counterpart of quantum non-local correlations. Moreover, in the proposed QDSS, signatory does 
not require to prepare public-private key pair and distribute public key before signing a message. 
Instead, he/she teleports the message over multiparty controlled EPR channels which directly 
results in a pair of non-locally correlated signatures. 
 
Multiparty controlled EPR channel 
Suppose Alice and Bob share a publically known EPR channel },,,{ −−++ ΨΦΨΦ∈Θab
between them where ( ) 2/1100 ±=Φ± and ( ) 2/1001 ±=Ψ ± . In standard 
teleportation17, Alice performs Bell state measurement (BSM)18 on quantum state aψ
 
and her 
half of EPR pair such that she gets classical 2-bits }11,10,01,00{∈′aa while Bob’s half becomes 
ab ψσψ = where },,,{ xzzxI σσσσσ ∈ is Pauli operator. If Alice knows state aψ , she also 
knows the state ab ψσψ =
 
on Bob’s side since Pauli encoding σ
 
is correlated with her 
classical BSM result aa ′ .  
In other words, EPR channel abΘ
 
is fully controlled by only one party, sender Alice 
here. Standard quantum teleportation has fascinating applications in quantum cryptography, 
information theoretic secrecy say, if sender and receiver are trusted. However, in case of mutual 
distrust between sender and receiver, there can be following issues: (i) the sender can repudiate 
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by altering both state aψ
 
and her BSM result aa ′ ; especially when delay between teleportation 
and announcement of classical information aa ′
 
is required by the cryptographic task. (ii) Even if 
Alice make classical information aa ′
 
public soon after teleportation occurs; still there is no way 
to overcome alteration from Bob and denial from Alice. 
 
 
Figure 1: Standard Teleportation: Alice and Bob share EPR pair abΘ  generated from some 
EPR source and Alice performs joint measurement on state aψ and her half of EPR pair such 
that she gets classical 2-bits aa ′ while Bob’s half becomes ab ψσψ = . If Alice sends her 
measurement result aa ′ to Bob, he can get aψ  by applying corresponding Pauli operator on his 
half . 
By performing entanglement swapping and teleportation together, a multiparty controlled 
EPR channel can be established where all three parties Alice, Bob, and Charlie have shares and 
neither party alone can control this channel14. Suppose a Bell state acΘ
 
is shared between Alice 
and Charlie while Bell state cb ′Θ
 
is shared between Bob and Charlie. If Charlie performs BSM 
on his halves, he gets two classical bits }11,10,01,00{∈′cc
 
while one of the four EPR channel 
+Φ=Θ abcab σ
 
swaps between Alice and Bob. Now if Alice teleports a quantum state aψ
 
to 
Bob over channel abΘ , Alice gets two classical bits }11,10,01,00{∈′aa
 
while Bob’s half 
becomes one of the four possibilities acab ψσσψ =  where Pauli encoding caσσ is correlated 
with both aa ′ and cc ′ .  
Here, the control of the EPR channel abΘ
 
is shared between all three parties Alice, Bob 
and Charlie. Charlie keeps classical information cc ′ , and hence knows the exact identity of 
channel abΘ . Alice possesses classical information aa ′
 
and message state aψ
 
but don’t know 
the encrypted message acab ψσσψ =
 
kept by Bob. Hence, Alice cannot simulate (repudiate) 
her alterations in state aψ
 
and BSM result aa ′  with acab ψσσψ = . Similarly, Bob keeps 
only state acab ψσσψ = but remains unknown to other shares aa ′ and cc ′
 
and hence Pauli 
encoding caσσ
 
unless both Alice and Charlie reveal their secrets. 
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When both Alice and Bob present their shares aψ , aa ′ and acab ψσσψ = respectively 
to Charlie, he can deduce whether acab ψσσψ = is consistent with non-locally correlated 
shares aa ′ and cc ′  or not. Such a multiparty controlled EPR channel guarantees security against 
masquerading, forgery from Bob and repudiation from Alice and hence allows unconditional 
transferability as demonstrated in next section where take +
′
Φ=Θ=Θ cbac . Hence,  
                                                  
a
ca
x
ca
zb ψσσψ ′⊕′⊕=                                                      (1) 
 
 
Figure 2: Setup for multiparty controlled EPR channel where Alice and Charlie share EPR pair 
acΘ while Bob and Charlie share cb ′Θ . Charlie performs BSM on his entangled halves and 
Alice performs BSM on the state aψ
 
and her half of EPR pair such that Bob’s half becomes 
acab ψσσψ = . Bob can only apply exact Pauli operator on his half and get the state aψ  if 
and only if he receives BSM results from both Alice and Charlie.  
 
Quantum digital signature scheme 
We demonstrate here a standard quantum signature scheme between sender Alice and two 
receivers Bob and Charlie. In the next section, we showed that the proposed QDSS guarantees 
information theoretic security against masquerading as well as repudiation and forgery.  
Multiparty controlled EPR channels: Suppose publically known n EPR pairs 
n
ac
⊗+Φ
 
are 
shared between Alice and Charlie while n EPR pairs 
n
cb
⊗+
′
Φ are shared between Bob and 
Charlie respectively. Charlie performs Bell state measurement on respective halves, stores BSM 
result ii
n
i
ccc ′⊗=
=1  
as his private key, and sends ii
n
ip
ccc ′⊕⊗=
=1
 to Bob securely. As a result, n EPR 
pairs 
n
ab
⊗Θ
 
swaps between Alice and Bob whose exact identity is known only to Charlie.  
Non-locally correlated Signature distribution: Alice prepares a quantum state 
na mmmm .....21=  corresponding to her classical message na mmmm .....21=
 
where }1,0{∈im  
and generates ii
n
ia
mU
1=
⊗=ψ by applying operator U qubitwise. The operator U is publically 
known and acts as a unitary transformation from computational basis }1,0{
 
to },{ 10 δδ basis; 
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( ) 2/1000 iU +==δ and ( ) 2/1011 iU −==δ . Alice generates and distributes her non-
locally correlated signatures as follows:  
(i) Alice teleports state aψ
 
to Bob over EPR channel nab
⊗Θ and stores BSM result ii
n
i
aaa ′⊗=
=1  
and )(
1 ii
n
ip
aaa ′⊕⊗=
=
as her private key pair ),( paa . As a result, entangled halves in possession of 
Bob become either
i
iiii
a
ca
x
ca
z
n
ib
ψσσψ ′⊕′⊕
=
⊗=
1
. Bob measures bψ in },{ 10 δδ basis and stores n-bit 
strings bS as Alice’s signature  
(ii) Alice generates her global signature, 
                                                                
i
ii
a
a
x
a
z
n
i
G
a ψσσψ ′
=
⊗=
1
  
                                                    (2) 
measures in },{ 10 δδ basis and announces the outcome GaS . 
Verification: Alice sends her secret pair },{ pa am ′′ , possibly altered, to Bob. Bob calculates GaS′
from equation (2) and verifies whether message is genuine or repudiated by comparing Alice’s 
signature bS and 
G
aS : 
                                                                 
G
a
G
a ii
SSv =′;1
                                                             
     (3) 
                                                           




=≠
==
1; 
0; 
;2
iii
iii
pb
G
a
pb
G
a
cSS
cSS
v
                                                      
      (4) 
If Bob authenticates the message with very high probability, he forwards the triplet },,{ bpa Sam ′′′ , 
possibly altered, to Charlie. Charlie concludes whether forgery or repudiation has occurred or not 
as follows:  Charlie calculates bS  from  
                                                               
ii
ii
b
G
a
c
z
c
x ψψσσ =′
              
                                             (5) 
and verifies  
                                                                   
ii bb SSv ′=;3
                                                             
     (6) 
If 3v
 
is satisfied with very high probability, he accepts the message genuine and secure against 
forgery from Bob and repudiation from Alice by verifying functions 1v and 2v
 
(3,4). (Warning: 
To authenticate no forgery, Charlie should not rely on Bob’s triplet },,{ bpa Sam ′′′ only to verify 
both functions 1v and 2v .) 
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Figure 3: Schematics of proposed quantum digital signature scheme. 
 
Security Analysis:  
In our proposed standard QDSS, information-theoretic security against forgery, repudiation and 
masquerading comes from the fundamental rules of quantum mechanics instead of computational 
hardness. Instead of distributing multiple copies of a unique quantum signature, non-locally 
correlated signatures guarantees no forgery, non-repudiation and hence transferability. Finally, 
the pre-shared EPR states and non-locally correlated signatures do not allow masquerades to 
impersonate by sending an illegal copy of signature for a signed message or constructing a 
different message for genuine signature.  
Theorem: Suppose Alice and Charlie share publically known EPR pairs 
n
ac
⊗+Φ while Bob and 
Charlie share publically known EPR pairs 
n
cb
⊗+
′
Φ . Charlie performs BSM on his entangled 
halves and Alice performs joint measurement on the state nii
n
ia
mU ⊗
=
∈⊗= },{ 101 δδψ and her 
halves of EPR paisr such that Charlie keeps 2n-bits ii
n
i
ccc ′⊗=
=1
, Alice gets 2n-bits ii
n
i
aaa ′⊗=
=1  
while Bob’s half becomes 
i
iiii
a
ca
x
ca
z
n
ib
ψσσψ ′⊕′⊕
=
⊗=
1
. Bob stores n-bit string bS as classical 
counterpart of Alice signature bψ while Alice announces classical counterpart GaS of state 
i
ii
a
a
x
a
z
n
i
G
a ψσσψ ′
=
⊗=
1  
as her global signature publically. 
(i) Non-repudiation: If Alice don’t know )(
1 ii
n
ip
ccc ′⊕⊗=
=
, she cannot change pair },{ pa am  such 
that both verification functions 1v and 2v
 
are satisfied with very high probability. 
(ii) Transferability: If Bob accepts the message genuine and transfers, Charlie will also accept 
the message valid with very high probability. 
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(iii) No forgery: Even if Bob knows both )(
1 ii
n
ip
aaa ′⊕⊗=
=
and )(
1 ii
n
ip
ccc ′⊕⊗=
=
, he cannot change 
triplet  },,{ bpa Sam such that all three verification functions 1v ,
 
2v , and 3v
 
are satisfied with very 
high probability. 
(iv) No masquerading: Any third party other than recipients Bob and Charlie, cannot 
impersonate Alice.   
Proof :  Alice’s signatures bψ
 
and Gaψ are not the copies of unique quantum state but are two 
different quantum states non-locally correlated with each other. From equation (1,2) 
                                                               
i
ii
i b
c
x
c
z
G
a ψσσψ ′=
              
                                             (7) 
Above relation between Alice’s signatures is independent of her BSM result aa ′ . Moreover, 
basis 0δ
 
and 1δ  are eigenbasis of Pauli operator xzσσ with eigenvalues i
 
and i−  respectively, 
zσ acts as not gate while xσ
 
acts as not plus phase flip gate in },{ 10 δδ basis; 10 δδσ ix = and 
01 δδσ ix −= . That is,  
                                                         
i
i
ixz i δδσσ )1(−=
              
                                             (9) 
                                                              
1⊕= iiz δδσ
             
                                                   (10) 
                                                              
1)1( ⊕−= iiix i δδσ
            
                                           (11) 
Since Alice do not know the Charlie’s private key ),( pcc , he cannot extract the Pauli encoding 
in equation (7). 
• If  0=
ip
c , then 
iiii b
G
ab
G
a SS =⇔= ψψ . 
• If  1=pc , then iiii b
G
ab
G
a SS ≠⇔≠ ψψ . 
(i) Non-repudiation: In the proposed QDSS Alice has very little resources to repudiate the 
message successfully: Charlie’s private key ),( pcc  and hence Bob’s share bS are unknown to 
Alice. Moreover, Alice’s signatures bS
 
and GaS
 
are correlated in a fashion such that unitary 
transformation between them are independent of her BSM result aa ′ (7). Hence, after 
distributing her global signature GaS , she cannot repudiate the message or create a dispute 
between Bob and Charlie by altering her pair },{ pa am  such that both verification functions 1v
and 2v
 
are satisfied with very high probability. There will be following two possibilities: 
• If Alice sends genuine pair },{ pa am , both verification functions 1v and 2v
 
will be 
satisfied with very high probability. 
• If Alice sends altered pair },{ pa am ′′ , verification functions 1v  can be satisfied but 
verification functions 2v
 
will FAIL with very high probability. 
                                                                      
n
nrepudiatiop 




≤
2
1
                                                                   
(8) 
(ii) Transferability: Proposed QDSS is secure against Alice’s attempts to repudiate the message 
and hence fulfils the condition of transferability: if Bob accepts the message valid and 
9 
 
transferable, then Charlie will also accept the message valid with very high probability. That is, 
authentication of Bob means verification function 2v
 
is satisfied with very high probability. 
Hence verification function 3v should also be verified by Charlie if Bob is not forging.  
(iii) No forgery: The most fascinating equalities in the proposed QDSS are (6) and (7); Charlie 
does not require },{ pa am  either from Alice or from Bob to authenticate verification function 3v . 
Non-local correlations generated through multiparty controlled EPR channel allow Charlie to 
extract Bob’s share bS
 
by using publically announced Alice’s global signature GaS
 
and his own 
private key ),( pcc . As a result, the verification function 3v  bounds Bob from forging triplet  
},,{ bpa Sam . If Bob does, all three verification functions 1v ,
 
2v , and 3v
 
will NOT be satisfied . 
(iv) No masquerading: Since EPR pairs nac
⊗+Φ and 
n
cb
⊗+
′
Φ are publically known, multiparty 
controlled EPR channels does not allow masquerading where signatory and receivers have non-
locally correlated information in a unique fashion.  
 
                                                              
 
QOWF Vs multiparty controlled EPR channel 
Quantum one-way functions can be obtained by defining a map ss ψ→  with classical r-bit 
string s as input and t-qubit quantum string sψ  as output5,7. By setting r exponentially longer 
than t, generating nearly orthogonal states sψ
 
and s′ψ  for ss ′≠ , it becomes impossible to 
invert the map ss ψ→ . That is, sψ  is easy to generate by knowing s
 
but hard to get s by 
knowing sψ .  
For establishing such an information-theoretic QOWF, Holevo’s theorem19 is the 
fundamental principle which shows that there is one-to-one correspondence between quantum 
and classical processing units; measurement on a single qubit can give at most single classical bit 
of information. Hence t-qubit quantum string sψ
 
can give maximum of t-bits but not classical 
string r >> t. As a result, QOWF guarantees information-theoretic security against 
masquerading, forgery as well as repudiation but make quantum memory an essential component 
of standard QDSS. 
On the other hand, multiparty controlled EPR channel achieves same goals as QOWF 
guarantees but without the requirement of quantum memory. Each qubit state 
ia
ψ
 
is associated 
with unique classical bit m. Hence mapping 
ia
m ψ→
 
is two-way but teleporting such states 
ia
ψ
 
over EPR channel controlled by multiparty allows generating two different quantum states 
that are non-locally correlated with each other where all three parties have some shares. Hence it 
becomes infeasible for any individual, signatory as well as recipient, to alter the state 
ia
ψ
 in a 
deterministic way.  
 
Discussion: 
We discussed that all the existing standard quantum digital signature schemes are based on 
quantum one-way functions. As a result, laws of quantum mechanics guarantee information-
theoretic security for classical message with quantum states as being signatures of sender. 
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However, the price of using quantum one-way functions is requirement of quantum memory for 
storing signatures and later swap tests for verification or comparison of signatures in case of 
dispute.  
We also discussed that there exist some quantum digital signature schemes without 
quantum memory or quantum one-way functions that are easy to demonstrate practically but 
such schemes are not standard; signatory keeps private classical information but it is not unique 
to him/her while making public decisions, enough for data authentication but not sufficient for 
user authentication. Hence, security against masquerading cannot be guaranteed over public 
channels, which is a serious drawback as for as standard digital signature scheme is concerned.   
 We then proposed an information-theoretic quantum digital signature scheme replacing 
quantum one-way functions with multiparty controlled EPR channels but without compromising 
standard security requirements for any practically feasible scheme. We showed that such EPR 
channels controlled by multiparty guarantees information-theoretic security by allowing two 
different quantum states as signatures of sender that are non-locally correlated with each other 
where all three parties have some shares. Hence it becomes infeasible for any individual, 
signatory as well as recipient, to alter the message or signature in a deterministic way. More 
importantly, signatures are not the copies of unique quantum state, as all previously existing 
QDSS have, but are two different but non-locally correlated states.  
Instead of using many-to-one mapping as QOWF does, we use one-to-one mapping of 
classical bits and quantum bits. This one-to-one mapping along with multiparty controlled EPR 
channels gives information-theoretic security and removes the requirement of quantum memory. 
Every recipient can store classical message in his classical memory and regenerate corresponding 
quantum message with the help of global public key whenever required. 
Moreover, unlike all the existing QDSS, proposed QDSS does not bound signatory to 
prepare public-private key pair and distribute public key before signing a message. Instead, 
he/she teleports the message over multiparty controlled EPR channels which directly results in a 
pair of non-locally correlated signatures and allow recipient to compare and verify message. This 
technique of generating non-locally correlated pair of states would also allow asymmetric 
quantum cryptography to become practically feasible and secure in general; public-private key 
pair generated through QOWF does not allow distributing indefinite copies of public key as 
classical asymmetric cryptography doe’s.  
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